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Taxation of an Attorney's Contingency Fee of a Punitive 
. * Damages Recovery: The Snvastava Approach 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With its landmark tax decision in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass 
Co., 1 the United States Supreme Court adopted the rule that litigants are 
required to include the punitive damages portion of awards in their tax-
able income. The Court's decision was based on the nature of the award, 
which the Court characterized as "undeniable accessions to wealth, 
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."2 
Based on this treatment, the Court concluded that punitive damages were 
clearly of the nature that Congress intended to be taxed, and reversed the 
Third Circuit's decision.3 This interpretation is now codified in section 
I 04 of the Internal Revenue Code, which exempts actual damages from 
certain lawsuits, but does not exempt punitive damages.4 
In spite of the Glenshaw Glass decision, there is still dispute about 
certain aspects of the punitive damages award. Recently, a noticeable 
split has occurred in the federal circuit courts regarding the proper treat-
ment of the portion of a punitive damages award retained by the litigant's 
attorney as a contingency fee. 5 This dispute between the circuits seems 
ripe for determination by the United States Supreme Court, but until the 
Supreme Court resolves the conflict, taxpayers and their attorneys are 
faced with the challenge of determining how they should calculate their 
taxes and approach the situation. 
This Note will first consider the reasoning employed by the different 
circuit courts of appeal, with particular emphasis on the decision of the 
Fifth Circuit in Srivastava v. Commissioner, which held that the portion 
of the settlement payable to the attorney under the contingency agree-
ment was not gross income for taxable purposes.6 The Srivastava ap-
* Copyright© 2001 by Benjamin C Rasmussen. 
I. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 ( 1955). 
2. !d. at 431 (emphasis added). 
3. !d. at 432-33. 
4. 26 U.S. C. § I 04(a)(2) ( 1994). 
5. See, ex, Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F. 3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000); Benci-Woodward v. 
Commissioner, 219 F. 3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000). 
6. See Srivastava, 220 F. 3d 353. 
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proach will be compared to other circuits to determine the key trends in 
the decisions. Next, this Note will address the most sound approaches 
and important considerations for practitioners dealing with the issue until 
such time as the United States Supreme Court gives a more definitive an-
swer to the question. Finally, this Note will examine possible solutions to 
this critical issue. 
II. THE FIFfH CIRCUIT APPROACH: SR!VASTA VA V. COMMISSIONER 
A. Factual Background 
The Fifth Circuit's opportunity to address the question of taxation of 
the contingency fee portion of a punitive damages recovery arose out of a 
substantial defamation suit involving two married doctors, Sudhir Sri-
vastava and Elizabeth S. Pascual (Petitioners).7 Petitioners were awarded 
twenty-nine million dollars in a jury verdict after a Texas television sta-
tion aired a series of investigative reports accusing the Petitioners of poor 
medical care and various criminal acts, which destroyed the Petitioners' 
medical practice and led to severe financial and emotional distress for the 
family. 8 After appeals, the parties came to a settlement with the station 
and its insurance carriers for $8.5 million.9 The parties divided the 
portions of the award paid by the station and three insurance companies, 
but did not distinguish between the actual and punitive damages ordered 
in making the settlement allotment. 10 After the Petitioners reported no 
taxable income from their award, the Internal Revenue Service issued a 
notice of deficiency to Petitioners allocating amounts to actual damages, 
punitive damages, and interest in proportion to the original jury award 
and taxing the amounts allocated to punitive damages and interest. 11 The 
Internal Revenue Service's estimation left the Petitioners with 
$1,466,348 in additional taxes and penalties for the tax years 1991 and 
1992.12 Upon appeal to the Tax Court, Petitioners argued that the portion 
of the settlement paid to their attorneys under a contingency fee agree-
ment was not includable in gross income. The Tax Court rejected their 
argument13 and allocated the settlement agreement similarly to the ap-
7. See id. at 355. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. 
10. See id. at 356. 
II. See id. 
12. See id. 
13. While not addressed in this casenote, the Tax Court has addressed this issue in an en bane 
decision. In Kenseth v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 399 (2000), the Tax Court, by an 8-5 vote, con-
cluded that attorneys' contingency fees are taxable to the client. See id. at 417. 
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proach of the Internal Revenue Service.14 It sustained the deficiency 
based upon the punitive damages award, but eliminated the penalties for 
Petitioners' failure to include the amounts in their reported income be-
cause of their reasonable cause for failing to do so. 15 
B. Say One Thing, Do the Opposite 
1. Clean slate perspective 
The Srivastava court began its analysis by looking at the facts of the 
case as if it was going to make the decision on a tabula rasa. 16 The court 
first looked for answers within the doctrine of anticipatory assignment of 
income. 17 The court noted that the doctrine usually centers around two 
extremes: where the taxpayer who controls the source of the income as-
signs future income to another to avoid taxation, or, in the alternative, 
where the taxpayer fully divests himself of control over the source by 
transferring or selling it to another. 18 Had this case fallen into one of 
those easily determined streams, the court thought that the solution 
would have been straight forward, but the Fifth Circuit felt that "contin-
gent fee contracts defy easy categorization."19 The court was of the opin-
ion that the contingency fee arrangement involved something similar to a 
partnership agreement with "virtual co-ownership" and a division of 
property.2° Concluding that this analysis gave no clear answer, the court 
looked to which party did the work to produce the money under the con-
tingency fee agreement, whether the contingency fee agreement involved 
a gratuitous transfer as opposed to an arm's length transfer, as well as 
how the uncertainty of the ultimate value of the contingency fee agree-
ment affected the analysis.21 In all three cases, the court concluded that 
the resulting analysis was of little or no help in determining whether the 
portion retained by the attorney should be taxed to the client.22 
Ultimately, the court determined that the closest analogy involved a 
plaintiff in a contingency fee case versus a plaintiff retaining counsel on 
a non-contingent fee agreement.23 The court concluded that the use of the 
14. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 356-57. 
15. See id. at 357. 
16. See id. 
17. See id. at 358. 
18. See id. at 358-59. 
19. /d. at 360. 
20. /d. 
21. See id. at 360-62. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. at 362. 
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contingency fee was merely a means of shifting the risk of loss, but that 
in the case of a judgment, both plaintiffs would have to pay their attor-
neys and should be taxed on their income in like manner.24 The court hy-
pothesized that it would not be fair to give Petitioners a tax windfall 
based solely on their choice of fee arrangement, because regardless of the 
arrangement they would still enjoy the same economic benefit upon fa-
vorable resolution of the case. 25 
2. Adherence to questioned precedent 
In spite of its analysis leading to the contrary conclusion, the Fifth 
Circuit decided that it could not rule on the matter from a clean slate, but 
instead was bound to follow the Cotnam v. Commissioner26 decision, 
which held that the amount of the contingency fee paid out of the judg-
ment to the attorney was not income to the taxpayer because, under Ala-
bama law, the attorney has an interest in the amount of the contingency 
fee. 27 The Internal Revenue Service urged the court to distinguish the 
case from Cotnam based on the different rights each state afforded to at-
torneys under a contingency fee arrangement. However, the Fifth Circuit 
declined to do so, concluding that this decision more appropriately be-
longed in the anticipatory assignment of income analysis, which pro-
duced no clear distinction between the two cases. 28 
In order to understand the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit, it is impor-
tant to understand the precedent to which the court felt bound. Cotnam is 
the oldest standing opinion concerning the taxability of attorney's con-
tingency fees from punitive damages. The Cotnam decision involved a 
question of Alabama law.29 Alabama law gave attorneys what was essen-
tially an equitable interest in their clients' recoveries.30 The taxpayer in 
Cotnam was precluded from receiving her part of the judgment because 
of her attorney's equitable lien on the judgment as applied by the courts 
of Alabama.31 The court concluded that because the taxpayer never 
would have been able to recover anything without the aid of counsel and 
because the attorneys earned the contingency fee in which they had a 
strong interest under Alabama law, the taxpayer had not realized any 
24. See id. at 362-63. 
25. See id. at 363. 
26. 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959). Cotnam was decided just four years after the landmark 
Glenshaw Glass decision originally required inclusion of punitive damages in gross income. 
27. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363. 
28. /d. at 363-64. 
29. See Cotnam. 263 F.2d at 125. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. 
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economic benefit from that portion of the recovery and could not be 
taxed for it.32 By comparison, Srivastava involved Texas law, which pro-
vides that "the lawyer's rights, based on the contingent fee contract, are 
wholly derivative from those of his client."33 
B. Why Not Right the Perceived Wrong? 
The differences in the state laws concerning attorneys' interests in 
contingency fees were clear, with Alabama law providing an attorney 
with an equal, if not superior interest, to his client's damages recovery34 
and Texas law subordinating the rights of the attorney to those of his cli-
ent.35 The distinctions would have allowed a simple mechanism to dis-
tinguish a precedent that the court's analysis clearly called into question. 
The Internal Revenue Service drew this conclusion,36 and Circuit Judge 
James L. Dennis noted as much in his dissenting opinion.37 Judge Dennis 
wrote: 
[T]he taxpayers in the present case did not by virtue of their attorney-
client contract divest themselves of part of their interests in the claim, 
or vest a legal, independently enforceable ownership interest in that 
claim in their attorneys. Accordingly, the taxpayers received as income 
the portions of the settlement consisting of punitive damages and inter-
est that were earmarked for the payment of their attorney's fees, and I 
believe that the taxpayer must pay taxes on those proceeds.38 
The Srivastava court's adherence to a 41-year-old precedent, despite 
a logical means for the precedent to be distinguished, brings to mind the 
wisdom of former Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. Justice Black 
wrote in another setting, "[ w ]hen precedent and precedent alone is all the 
argument that can be made to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time 
for the rule's creator to destroy it. "39 Even if the Srivastava court felt that 
Cotnam followed a logical line of reason, the court noted in its own 
analysis of the issue that it considered the Cotnam line of reasoning to be 
unpersuasive.40 However, the dissent's reasoning in Cotnam provided 
32. See id. at 125-26. 
33. Dow Chemical Co. v. Benton, 357 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tex. 1962). 
34. ALA. CODE § 61 (1940), cited in Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 123 n.4. 
35. See Dow Chemical Co., 357 S.W.2d at 567. 
36. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363. 
37. See id. at 367 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
38. !d. at 369. 
39. Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445,471 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting). 
40. The concurring opinion in Cotnam, which constituted the majority on this question, in 
addition to focusing heavily on the distinguishable Alabama law, relied in large part on the argument 
that without the services of the attorney, a client's claim would never bear fruit, and that as such, a 
client should not be taxed on the portion it did not receive. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125-26. Of this 
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support for the Srivastava court's conclusion.41 The court noted the wide 
disagreement that exists in the circuit courts on this issue.42 The majority 
in Srivastava had plenty of reason for abandoning the old Fifth Circuit 
rule and ample persuasive support from other circuits going the other 
way. Its reliance on the antiquated Cotnam precedent at least raises ques-
tions.43 
Indeed, when compared to the other circuits that have given opinions 
on this issue, the Srivastava court was the only circuit that used prece-
dent as a crutch in making its decision conform to an outcome it ques-
tioned. As will be seen, there is legal support for either position on this 
critical issue. The analyses of the other circuits on both sides of the issue, 
many of which were available for the Fifth Circuit to consider, make the 
ultimate conclusion of the court less compelling and more questionable. 
This Note will consider the lines of reasoning employed by these courts 
and compare them to the Srivastava outcome. 
III. CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES INCLUDING THE ATTORNEY'S 
CONTINGENCY FEE IN GROSS INCOME 
In the last five years, three circuits have ruled against taxpayers who 
excluded their attorneys' contingency fee from their gross income.44 In 
most instances, these circuits have followed a similar line of reasoning. 
Additionally, the line of reasoning prevailing in these circuits ts very 
similar to the clean slate analysis provided in Srivastava. 
A. The Federal Circuit 
In 1995, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue in Baylin v. United 
States.45 Baylin involved a dispute between a partnership and the Mary-
line of reasoning the Srivastava court wrote, "That gain - no less than the non-monetary gains rec-
ognized as income in Earl, Horst, and their progeny- is not to be excluded from gross income solely 
on the basis that the money is diverted to, and realized by, the taxpayer's assignee." Srivastava, 220 
F.3d at 363. 
41. Judge Wisdom dissented from the Cotnam decision under the theory that even though the 
taxpayer never actually took control of the portion of her damages that went to her attorney under 
the contingency fee agreement, she enjoyed the benefit of the damages award and should have been 
taxed on it. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 127. 
42. See Srivastava, 220 F. 3d at 358. 
43. It should be noted that technically the Fifth Circuit could not have completely overruled 
the Cotnam decision in Srivastava. Fifth Circuit rules preclude a three-judge panel from overturning 
a prior decision within the circuit, absent an en bane review by the court. See Floors Unlimited, Inc. 
v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 55 F.3d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1995). 
44. See Bend-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000); Coady v. Comm'r, 213 
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995); Baylin v. United States, 
43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
45. 43 F.3d at 1451. 
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land State Highway Administration, which condemned 137 acres owned 
by the partnership.46 The partnership disputed the state's valuation of its 
property and entered into a contingency fee agreement with its attorneys 
to challenge the valuation in court.47 The partnership deducted the legal 
fees as a business expense incurred in the collection of income.48 The 
court rejected the taxpayers' argument that the portion of the attorneys' 
fees derived from interest on the principal judgment in their favor was a 
business expense, focusing on the "origin of the claim" test from United 
States v. Gilmore,49 and determining that the legal fees in this case were 
more appropriately classified as a capital expenditure. 5° 
The taxpayers advanced an alternative argument that is more perti-
nent to this Note's analysis. They argued that because they assigned the 
portion going to their attorneys in advance, they had never realized the 
income.51 They relied on Maryland law, which gives an attorney a lien 
on the eventual judgment in the case of a contingency fee agreement.52 
The Federal Circuit, however, was not persuaded by the taxpayers' ar-
guments. It noted that the lien available in Maryland Jaw simply gave the 
attorneys extra security on the debt owed them by their client.53 This 
court was most persuaded by the fact that the courts have broadly defined 
the definition of gross income and reasoned that, unless specifically ex-
empted, the taxpayers' accession to wealth was taxable.54 The court 
noted that the taxpayers clearly enjoyed a benefit from the increased 
valuation brought about by their attorneys' work and did not accept that 
the taxpayers and their attorneys could dictate their own treatment under 
the law.55 Specifically, the court noted that "[t]he temporarily uncertain 
magnitude of the legal fees under such an arrangement and the vehicle of 
an assignment cannot dictate the income tax treatment of those fees."56 
As evidenced by the three paragraphs of treatment the court gave the is-
sue, the Federal Circuit didn't seem to find the issue a difficult one. 57 
46. See id. at 1452. 
47. /d. 
48. See id. at 1453; 26 U.S.C. § 212(1) (1988). 
49. 372 U.S. 39 (1963). 
50. See Bay/in, 43 F.3d at 1453-54. 
51. See id. at 1454-55. 
52. See id. at 1455. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. at 1454. 
55. See id. at 1454-55. 
56. /d. at 1455. 
57. See id. at 1454-55. 
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B. The First Circuit 
Later in 1995 the First Circuit indirectly addressed this issue in Alex-
ander v. Internal Revenue Service.58 Alexander involved a terminated 
employee who obtained a settlement from his former employer after he 
filed suit seeking damages for age discrimination and breach of con-
tract.59 The First Circuit rejected the taxpayers' arguments that his legal 
fees were deductible under several sections of the code. 60 
Like the taxpayers in Baylin, after losing other battles, the taxpayer 
in Alexander sought to exclude part of his attorneys' fees from gross in-
come because he never had control.61 After the settlement, the employer 
provided checks jointly payable to the taxpayer and his attorneys in satis-
faction of the agreement.62 The taxpayer argued that under 26 U.S.C. § 
62(a)(2)(A), where the taxpayer was being classified as an employee by 
the court, satisfaction of his contingency fee agreement by payment to 
the attorneys was a deductible reimbursement arrangement.63 Like Bay-
lin, the taxpayer in Alexander tried to persuade the court with state law, 
in this case Massachusetts, which gave the attorney a lien on the pay-
ment, and which precluded the taxpayer from enjoying the benefit of that 
portion of the funds. 64 
The First Circuit did not address the issue in the manner that the 
other similarly holding circuits did. Instead, the First Circuit refused to 
consider the issue where there was no support in the record that a contin-
gency fee agreement was formally entered into.65 The court rejected the 
taxpayer's argument that the agreement was implied by the parties as 
part of the standard operating procedure for cases of the kind.66 Although 
the setting in which it rejected the taxpayer's argument is distinguish-
able, the First Circuit demonstrated that it would not let the taxpayer use 
his agreement with his attorney to avoid tax liability.67 
C. The Ninth Circuit 
The Federal Circuit and the First Circuit differed from Srivastava in 
that no reference was made to Cotnam as support for the taxpayers' at-
58. 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995). 
59. See id. at 940. 
60. See id. at 941. 
61. See id. at 945. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. at 945-46. 
64. See id. at 946. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. 
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tempts to exclude their attorneys' contingency fees from taxable income. 
However, the case in which the Ninth Circuit first addressed the issue, 
Coady v. Commissioner,68 involved a direct argument by the taxpayer 
based on Cotnam, although it was not controlling precedent for that 
court.69 Coady, like Alexander, was a wrongful termination suit where 
the taxpayer claimed a deduction for his attorneys' fees. The taxpayer re-
lied directly on Cotnam and claimed that they had not realized the in-
come because it was assigned to their attorneys.70 Alaska law gives an 
attorney a lien on his client's funds, but the Alaska courts have inter-
preted it not to give any ownership interest to the attorney, thus differing 
from the Alabama statute involved in Cotnam.71 
At the outset, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a split existed among 
the circuits on this issue.72 However, this court found convincing the rea-
soning employed by the courts in Bay/in and Alexander, as well as the 
reasoning of the dissent in Cotnam.73 The court wrote that "[t]he Su-
preme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that taxation can be es-
caped by procuring payment directly to creditors or by making anticipa-
tory arrangements to prevent earnings from 'vesting even for a second' 
in the person who earned it."74 Like the Federal Circuit, the Ninth Circuit 
refused to distinguish a contingency fee arrangement because of the un-
certainty of the outcome and held that anticipatory assignments made to 
prevent earnings from vesting in the taxpayer will not be recognized for 
tax purposes.75 The court further distinguished the case from Cotnam and 
Estate of Clarks v. United States,76 which will be considered in the next 
section of this Note, based on the nature of the state law, where Cotnam 
was based on a law where attorneys have a greater interest in their por-
tion of the judgment than their clients under a contingency fee arrange-
ment.77 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue again in a decision filed a little 
over a month after its Coady decision, Benci-Woodward v. Commis-
sioner.78 Benci-Woodward dealt with an issue more similar to Srivastava 
than the other courts, choosing to not exclude an attorney's contingency 
68. 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). 
69. See id. at 1188. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. at 1190. 
72. See id. at 1189. 
73. See id. at 1190. 
74. !d. at 1191. 
75. See id. at 1191. 
76. 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000). 
77. See Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190. 
78. 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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fee income from the taxpayer's gross income. Benci-Woodward involved 
the portion of attorneys' fees arising from a punitive damages award in a 
tort complaint filed against Target Stores for several torts and contract 
counts, including wrongful terrnination.79 Benci-Woodward was based on 
California law, in which contingency fee contracts "do not operate to 
transfer a part of the cause of action to the attorney but only give him a 
lien upon his client's recovery."80 As such, the Ninth Circuit deferred to 
its Coady decision and distinguished the California law based on the 
lesser interest available to an attorney in the state.81 
D. Prevailing Themes in the Federal, First, and Ninth Circuits 
There are two important prevailing themes in the decisions of the 
courts that have required inclusion of an attorney's contingency fee por-
tion of a settlement or award in gross income. First, these courts have 
generally done so under the theory that for tax purposes contingency fee 
agreements are nothing more than anticipatory assignments of income 
from the client to the attorney.82 Courts have consistently held that such 
transfers of interest will not provide a means for the taxpayer to reduce 
his liability.83 Second, these courts have consistently distinguished their 
respective cases based on state laws that do not provide the attorney with 
an equal interest in the contingency fee. 84 Both of these themes are simi-
lar to analyses considered, favored, and ultimately rejected by the Sri-
vastava court in the name of precedent.85 However, the Fifth Circuit, as 
evidenced in the next section of this note, is not the only court to take the 
position it did. 
IV. OTHER CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES EXCLUDING THE ATTORNEY'S 
CONTINGENCY FEE FROM GROSS INCOME 
Aside from the Fifth Circuit, two other circuits have taken the posi-
tion that the contingency fee received by the attorney is not taxable in-
come to the client. The Eleventh and Sixth Circuits have also followed 
79. See id. at 942-43. 
80. Fifield Manorv. Finston, 354 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Cal. 1960). 
81. See Benci-Woodward, 219 F.3d at 943. 
82. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454-55; Coady, 213 F.3d at 1188-91. 
83. See e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill ( 1930). 
84. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455; Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190; Bend-Woodward, 219 F.3d at 
943; Alexander, 72 F.3d at 946. Although the Alexander court did not specifically distinguish the 
Massachusetts law, it did reject the taxpayer's claim under the Massachusetts statute in similar fash-
ion to the other courts discussed in this section. 
85. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 362-63, 369. But see id. at 363-64 (declining to distinguish 
the case based on the differences in Texas and Alabama law). 
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this approach. 86 While the Eleventh Circuit approach was ultimately 
somewhat similar to that employed in Srivastava, the Sixth Circuit em-
ployed a different line of reasoning that demonstrates more fully the dif-
ferences in the opinions on this side of the issue. 
A. The Eleventh Circuit 
The Internal Revenue Service has attempted to challenge the Cotnam 
rule in the Eleventh Circuit, in addition to the Fifth. The Eleventh Circuit 
was split off from the old Fifth Circuit in 1981 and is bound by Cotnam 
to the same extent as the present Fifth Circuit. The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice brought its Eleventh Circuit challenge in Davis v. Commissioner. 87 
This case arose out of a lawsuit against a mortgage company in which 
the taxpayer won over six million dollars, nearly all in punitive dam-
ages.88 In Davis, the taxpayer prevailed at the Tax Court level prior to 
consideration by the Eleventh Circuit. 
The Eleventh Circuit's consideration of the issue was the briefest of 
all of the circuits addressing similar questions. The court noted that this 
was simply an attempt by the Internal Revenue Service to get the circuit 
to do away with precedent that the Service did not like.89 The Eleventh 
Circuit considered Davis to be right on point with the earlier Cotnam de-
cision and affirmed the decision of the Tax Court in accordance with a 
precedent "squarely on point."90 However, unlike the Fifth Circuit in Sri-
vastava, the Eleventh Circuit did not openly call into question its own 
decision by undermining its logic with contradictory reasoning and 
I . 91 ana ysts. 
B. The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit dealt with the treatment of an attorney's contin-
gency fee in Clarks.92 This case arose after K-Mart Corporation lost a 
personal injury case brought by Arthur Clarks in 1988.93 K-Mart paid the 
damages in 1991 with interest and shortly thereafter Clarks died.94 The 
86. See Clarks, 202 F.3d at 854; Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346 (lith Cir. 2000). 
87. 210 F.3d 1346. 
88. See id. at 1347. 
89. See id. at 1347 n.4. 
90. Id. at 1347. The court further noted that it could not overrule Cotnam without a hearing 
of the en bane court. See supra note 44. 
91. The Davis court did not have the opportunity to distinguish Cotnam under state laws as 
did the Srivastava court. Davis involved Alabama law, just as Cotnam did. See id. at 1346. 
92. 202 F. 3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000). 
93. See id. at 855. 
94. See id. 
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issue arises in Clarks because Clarks' estate failed to include the contin-
gency fee portion arising out of the interest on the judgment in Clarks' 
Form 1040 for 1991.95 The estate never received the portion of the inter-
est payable to the attorneys under the contingency fee. 96 After auditing 
the estate's return, the Internal Revenue Service issued a deficiency no-
tice because the estate failed to include the attorneys' fees as gross in-
come.97 
After the district court granted summary judgment against the estate, 
the Sixth Circuit reversed.98 The Sixth Circuit's analysis, like many of 
the other circuits addressing the issue, centered on Cotnam. After consid-
ering the Cotnam decision, the Clarks court looked to Michigan law to 
compare the attorney's interest in the contingency fee to the Alabama 
law in Cotnam.99 The Sixth Circuit was persuaded by the fact that under 
Michigan law the contingency fee agreement assigned a portion of the 
judgment to the attorney, and at the same time gave him superior rights 
to recovery of that portion than those of his client. 100 
On this basis, the Sixth Circuit sought to distinguish itself from the 
Federal Circuit in Bay/in. It said that the Baylin court's reliance on Lucas 
v. Ear/101 and Helvering v. Horst 101 did not apply to this case because the 
assignments in those cases centered around gifts to family members al-
ready earned by the taxpayer and vested to him. 103 The Clarks court rea-
soned that the assignment in a contingency fee case was totally different 
for a couple of reasons. First, it noted that under a typical assignment to 
avoid income, the assignee was not taxed on the income because it is 
taxable income to the assignor or donor under Lucas and Horst. 104 The 
court contrasted this to a contingency fee arrangement where the attorney 
will be taxed on the income, allowing for double taxation under the ap-
proach the Internal Revenue Service was advocating. 105 
Second, the Sixth Circuit focused on the nature of the assignment, 
reasoning that it was closer to a division of property between tenants in 
common or a partnership. 106 More importantly perhaps, the court focused 
95. See id. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. at 856. 
99. See id. 
100. See id. 
101. 281 U.S. III (1930). 
102. 311 U.S. 112 (1940). 
103. See Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. 
106. See id. at 857-58. 
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on the work involved in reaping the benefits of the personal injury judg-
ment, noting that neither party would benefit from the money without the 
skills and work of the attorney .107 The court wrote that "[t]he income 
should be charged to the one who earned it and received it, not as under 
the government's theory of the case, to one who neither received it nor 
earned it." 108 
Thus, in Clarks, the Sixth Circuit articulated a position to support 
exclusion of an attorney's contingency fee (a derived interest on the 
judgments as opposed to punitive damages in this case), which was not 
the line of reasoning used by the other two circuits coming to similar 
conclusions. Where Srivastava and Davis essentially based their decision 
solely on the Cotnam precedent, Clarks articulated an approach based 
partly on the treatment of the attorney lien under Michigan law, where 
the court sought to avoid double taxation, as well as taxing the party who 
earned and received possession of the money under a partnership ap-
proach, something that the client does not do under a contingency fee 
agreement. 
V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: HOW SHOULD AN ATTORNEY ADVISE 
HIS CLIENT NOW? 
Given the wide range of opinions espoused by the circuits, practitio-
ners face several issues in determining what approaches to take with their 
clients. Among the concerns attorneys must consider is how best to pro-
tect their client's interests while simultaneously minimizing their tax ex-
posure. The balance can be a tricky course that must be navigated with 
precision. Attention to certain details and considerations will make an 
attorney better able to protect his client in reporting income and dealing 
with other related tax issues arising from the contingency fee agreement. 
The first issue of particular concern is the nature of the attorney's 
rights as afforded by the law of the state where the client resides. Most of 
the cases have given some attention to the nature of the state's statutes or 
case law and how an attorney's rights in his contingency fee compare to 
the rights of his client. 109 Where many of the circuits allowing exclusion 
of the attorneys' fees give deference to the rights of the attorney under 
state law, attorneys practicing in states with favorable laws may have a 
greater argument for urging their clients to exclude the attorneys' fees 
from income. The argument may even be a valid one in circuits who 
have sided with the Internal Revenue Service, since many such cases 
107. See id. at 858. 
108. /d. 
109. See e.g., Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363. 
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were decided by distinguishing the nature of the state law from the Ala-
bama statute involved in Cotnam. 110 With specific state legal rights in 
mind, parties can structure contingency fee agreements to provide appro-
priate liens to the attorney, as well as structure the method that defen-
dants will pay out settlements and judgments.111 
Along the same lines, attorneys need to carefully consider how cer-
tain documents can be structured to make the facts more favorable to the 
client. The Srivastava court considered the Tax Court's allotment of the 
settlement for purposes of determining what part of the settlement was 
attributable to punitive damages and interest. 112 The taxpayer was argua-
bly hindered because the settlement agreement did not specify the party's 
intentions with regard to the all0tment between actual and other dam-
ages.113 The taxpayer was also limited in his ability to argue for a more 
favorable allotment by virtue of the wording of his request for damages 
in the original defamation complaint. 114 As such, practitioners would be 
wise to carefully word settlement agreements, as well as any other plead-
ings throughout the litigation process, in such a way that will benefit the 
client's tax interests down the road by expressing how the parties wish 
the settlement to be allotted between the different kinds of damages. 
While such attempts may not ultimately prevail in persuading the court, 
they are likely to give an appellant more credibility in reaching their ul-
timate goal. 
Next, attorneys should be careful to take into consideration the con-
sequences of section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 83 pro-
vides that when property rights are transferred by one party to another 
party, in connection with the performance of services, and subject to a 
substantial risk of forfeiture, the fair market value of these rights should 
be included in the transferor's taxable income when the interest loses its 
substantial risk of forfeiture. 115 Some recent academic analysis suggests 
that an attorney's contingency fee interest is a capital interest that is gov-
erned by section 83. 116 Although none of the circuits addressing the issue 
have considered Section 83 in their analysis, application of it may lead to 
110. See e.g., Coady, 213 F.2d at 1190. 
III. See Robert W. Richards, Jr. & Fred Meissner, Feature: A New IRS Tax Audit Trigger j(Jr 
Attorneys: Form 1099 Misc., 41 ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 8, 9 (1999). 
112. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 365. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. In Srivastava, the petitioner attempted to have the allotment adjusted to reflect 
only actual damages based on the fact that the settlement for $8.5 million between the taxpayer and 
the defendants was the same as the actual damages requested in the complaint. The court took issue 
partly because the complaint requested "an amount in excess of $8,500,000.00." /d. at 365. 
115. See 26 U.S.C. § 83(l)(A) (1994). 
116. See Gregg D. Polsky, Taxing Contingent Attorneys' Fees: Many Courts Are Getting It 
Wrong, 89 TAX NOTES 917 (Nov. 13, 2000). 
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a different result in cases like Clarks where the pro-taxpayer decision 
was made based significantly on a partnership analysis. 117 Consideration 
of this section may lead to different structuring of fee agreements in an-
ticipation of its application. 
Determining the tax approach may also have consequences in how 
the Internal Revenue Service deals with the returns in an eventual audit 
and assessment of deficiency, depending on the circuit from which the 
considerations are derived. Attempts to get around the circuits' decisions 
could, theoretically, subject a taxpayer to penalties for substantial under-
statement of tax under section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code unless 
there is sufficient authority to establish the existence of reasonable cause 
or a good faith belief that the taxpayer would be treated otherwise. 118 
While the Internal Revenue Service may not assert these or similar pen-
alties in all cases, the expense involved in potentially challenging the 
penalties, or worse paying them, can be great to a taxpayer if their argu-
ments for exclusion of the attorneys' fees are not sufficiently based on 
the relevant precedents. 119 
Finally, those taxpayers who fear the consequences and costs in-
volved in a potential court fight with the Internal Revenue Service have 
other options available to them under the Internal Revenue Code. The 
code provides that taxpayers may take deductions for business expenses, 
120 
ordinary and necessary expenses "for the production or collection of 
income," 121 and other expenses. Depending on the circumstances and 
facts in the given case, attorneys' contingency fees may be deductible 
and would reduce the taxpayer's tax liability. While deductions may not 
be the most ideal end for a client, 122 where exclusion of the contingency 
fee from income is not an option because of the jurisdiction or otherwise, 
these deductions may serve to alleviate some of the financial pain ex-
perienced by the taxpayer on April 15th. 
117. See id. at 922. But see Robert W. Wood, Leave Section 83 Out of This Mess, 89 TAX 
NOTES 1187 (Nov. 27, 2000) (arguing that section 83 analysis has no place in determining whether 
the attorney's portion of the contingency fee should be taxed to the client). 
118. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4 (200 I). 
119. See Sheldon I. Banoff & Richard M. Lipton, Whipsaw on Lawsuit Settlements: The 
Courts Still Can't Agree, 93 J. TAX'N. 12 (Sep. 2000). 
120. See 26 U.S.C. § 162 (1994). 
121. 26 U.S.C. § 212(1) (1994). 
122. Under 26 U.S.C. § 67 (1994), the deductions may be subject to a floor equal to two per-
cent of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income. They are also subject to phase-out for higher income 
taxpayers. See 26 U.S.C. § 68 (1994). Similarly, for purposes of the Alternative Minimum Tax, 
attorney's fees are not deductible where limited under§ 67. See 26 U.S.C. § 56(b)(l)(A)(i) (1994). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that many questions still linger over the proper treat-
ment of an attorney's contingency fee arising from punitive damages, in-
terest on the judgment, and the like. The Srivastava decision, with analy-
sis that seems to indicate one thing and a conclusion that says another, 
seems representative of the existent split among many of the circuit 
courts of appeals in the United States. Attorneys and their clients have a 
daunting challenge to look to the approach prevailing in their circuits or 
circumstances similar to their own. Their analysis of the issues must be 
carefully done to avoid the messy consequences and high costs that may 
result from misguided planning. 
In spite of its contradictory result, the Srivastava court's analysis 
probably comes closest to providing a reasonable solution. The court 
wrote: 
A taxpayer who enters into the contract recognizes that, to realize and 
maximize the value of his claim, he must necessarily obtain the re-
sources and expertise of counsel. But of course, the same is true of a 
client who retains counsel on a non-contingent fee basis. The fact that a 
contingent fee arrangement has the added benefits of risk-shifting and 
realignment of incentives does not alter the economic reality . 
. . . He ought not receive preferential tax treatment from the simple for-
tuity that he hired counsel on a contingent basis, for his attorney's 
method of compensation did not meaningfully affect the gain he was 
able to enjoy from a favorable resolution of the litigation. 123 
Under the often-debated principle of horizontal equity in tax, simi-
larly situated taxpayers should be treated equally by the tax code and the 
courts. As the Fifth Circuit noted, there is no reason to reward a taxpayer 
for pursuing their litigation with attorneys who are willing to enter into a 
contingent arrangement. 124 To the contrary, this kind of approach is tan-
tamount to punishing those who are financially able to deal with their 
counsel under a more traditional fee agreement. While it is arguable that 
those who employ attorneys on a contingency fee basis have less means 
than their counterparts, that loses relevance after a judgment is paid out. 
In either circumstance, the taxpayer has received a judgment, and where 
the judgment is not excludable under the Internal Revenue Code, the tax 
treatment should be similar. A clear congressional or judicial directive to 
include an attorney's contingency fee payment in the client's income 
123. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 362-63. 
124. See id. 
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would be the best resolution to the conflict as a matter of fairness and 
equity. 
Perhaps one day Congress or the Supreme Court will provide some 
means of establishing uniformity in this increasingly difficult area and 
will resolve the split amongst the circuits. There are any number of vi-
able approaches that could be employed to resolve the issue. Until then, 
taxpayers will be forced to keep grappling with the Internal Revenue 
Service through its appellate procedures and the courts in hopes of 
minimizing their tax liability. 
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